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Abstract 
This paper studies the determinants of a firm’s organizational form in the context of an 
imperfectly competitive industry. There are two kinds of organizational forms: the multi-divisional 
form (M-form) and the unitary form (U-form). An M-form firm suffers from ignorance of demand 
externalities among different products and double marginalization is eliminated. In contrast, in a 
U-form firm, demand externalities are taken into consideration and double marginalization exists. 
A firm’s optimal choice of organizational form depends on the market structure. 
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1. Introduction 
Two kinds of organizational forms have been studied extensively in the literature: the 
unitary organizational form (U-form) and the multi-divisional organizational form (M-form).1 A 
U-form firm is organized by functions, such as production and marketing. The Ford Motor 
Company before World War II was an example of the U-form firm. An M-form firm is organized 
by products and each product has its own production and sales divisions. An example of an M-
form firm is the General Motors Company. As firms frequently engage in costly reshuffling of 
their structure, one interesting thing to know is what determines a firm’s choice of organizational 
form. 
This article studies how market structure affects a firm’s choice between the U-form and 
the M-form organizational form. Market structure refers specifically to the number of firms in the 
industry, and how market demand for different products may be related. Each firm produces two 
products. To produce each product, both production and marketing activities are needed. In a U-
form organization, there is a middle manager of production and a middle manager for marketing. 
                                                          
1 Chandler (1962) records that du Pont, General Motors, and some other firms’ changed their organizational modes 
from the U-form to the M-form in the 1920s. At that period, many firms began to produce multiple products. As a 
result, top managers could not supervise all decisions. Top managers had two options. The first option was to keep 
organizing firms by functional departments and give managers of functional departments more authority. The second 
one was to adopt the M-form organizational mode. By giving product managers more authority, top managers can 
concentrate on more strategic issues. See Williamson (1985) for some additional study on this issue.  
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Each functional manager maximizes his or her division’s profit. In an M-form organization, there 
is a middle manager for each product. Each product manager maximizes his or her product 
division’s profit. Firms are assumed to engage in Cournot competition. 
Each organizational form has its own advantages and disadvantages. In a U-form firm, 
demand externalities between different products are taken into consideration. However, a U-form 
firm may suffer from double marginalization because the middle manager of production chooses 
transfer prices to maximize the production division’s profit. An M-form firm eliminates double 
marginalization. On the other hand, a product manager in an M-form firm may be only concerned 
with the profit of the product she supervises, ignoring the fact that market demand for different 
goods are interdependent.  
In this article, we show that a firm's optimal choice of organizational form depends on the 
number of firms in the industry, and whether goods are substitutes or complements. As firms face 
the same price, a firm has a higher profit, if and only if, it has a higher output. Whether a U-form 
or an M-form firm has a higher output depends on whether the two products are substitutes or 
complements. When the two products are substitutes, it is shown that adopting the M-form 
organizational mode gives a firm higher profit than adopting the U-form organizational mode. 
When there are multiple firms in the industry, the over-expansion of output of an M-form firm is 
beneficial to this firm as this expansion makes other firms in the industry less aggressive. In 
contrast, the U-form firm’s output is too low, but it is a positive externality to other firms. As a 
result, an M-form firm makes a higher profit than a U-form firm when there are multiple firms in 
the industry. In this sense, the economics is similar to that of Fershtman and Judd (1987), except 
that the choice of organizational form is probably a far more credible commitment than the 
contractual commitments considered in their paper.2 When products are strong complements, the 
U-form firm has a higher output and profit because the demand externalities are taken into 
consideration. As the number of firms in the industry increases, whether the difference of output 
increases or not, depends on whether the slope of the U-form firm’s reaction curve is larger or 
smaller than that of an M-form firm. 
Two issues merit some explanation. The first issue is that neither the U-form nor the M-
form organizational mode may be optimal. Even if this is the case, a study of the choice between 
                                                          
2 Related studies include Baye, Crocker, and Ju (1996) and Tan and Yuan (2003). Both papers study a two-stage game. 
In the first stage, firms choose their divisionalization or divestiture strategies. In the second stage, divisions engage in 
quantity or price competition. 
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the U-form and the M-form organizational mode can still be justified. One reason is that the 
optimal organizational form may be too complex to be implemented in real world situations. As 
the U-form and the M-form organizations are commonly observed in real world situations, there 
is some merit in understanding the advantages and disadvantages of adopting these organizational 
forms. The second issue is that one may wonder whether a U-form firm suffers from double 
marginalization or not. In real world situations, double marginalization is frequently observed. 
How to decide transfer prices between different functional departments is not a trivial issue in a 
large organization.3 Based on survey data, Eccles and White (1988) find that mandated market-
based transfer pricing is one of the three kinds of transfer pricing policies commonly used by 
firms.4 When a firm adopts this kind of pricing policy, internal transactions are valued at market 
prices. “Buying profit centers that pay market price commonly complain that the intermediate good 
is being ‘marked up twice’, once by the selling profit center and again by the buying profit center” 
(Eccles and White 1988, p. S31). Eccles and White (1988) record a case in which the transfer price 
of an intermediate input is twice the production cost of that input.  
For the literature on organizational forms, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1991), Aghion and 
Tirole (1995), Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000), and Qian, Roland, and Xu (2002). The approach of 
modeling organizational forms used in this article is similar to that of Aghion and Tirole (1995). 
In their paper, a firm produces two products and each product needs production and marketing 
activities. A U-form organizational form is organized into the production department and the 
marketing department. An M-form organizational firm is organized by products. None of the above 
papers studies how a firm's choice of organizational form is affected by the market structure. 
However, market structure, such as the number of firms in the industry and how market demand 
for different products is related, provides the basic environment in which firms operate. As a firm’s 
marginal benefit and marginal cost are affected by market structure, a firm’s optimal choice of 
organizational form is affected by market structure. In fact, the influence of market structure on a 
firm’s behavior is well recognized in the literature. For example, Fershtman and Judd (1987) show 
that a firm’s choice of incentive scheme depends on market structure. When a firm is a monopolist 
in an industry, owners of this firm will try to get the managers to maximize profit. When a firm is 
                                                          
3 See Eccles and White (1988) for the conflict between middle level managers about transfer prices. 
4 The other two methods are mandated full cost transfers and exchange autonomy transfers. 
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one of multiple firms in the industry, owners will provide incentives to managers to expand output 
to take advantage of the strategic interaction among firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and compares the 
equilibrium output and profit of the two organizational forms. In Section 3, equilibrium 
organizational forms are studied. Section 4 studies the special case of linear market demand. 
Section 5 discusses some assumptions of this paper and concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
There are 𝑛 firms in an industry, 𝑛 ≥ 1. For all these 𝑛 firms, suppose 𝑚 of them adopt the 
U-form and 𝑛 − 𝑚  of them adopt the M-form organizational mode. Each firm produces two 
products: 𝑖 and 𝑗. Producing each product requires two activities: production and marketing. How 
activities are organized depends on the decision of the top manager of a firm. There are three levels 
of managers in each firm: top, middle, and low-level managers. The top manager of a firm chooses 
which organizational form to adopt. If a top manager chooses the M-form, for each of the two 
products, the production stage and the marketing stage will be supervised by the same middle 
manager. The two middle managers in an M-form firm will be called the middle manager for 
product 𝑖 and the middle manager for product 𝑗. If the top manager chooses the U-form, one middle 
manager will supervise the two production departments and the other middle manager will 
supervise the two marketing departments. The two middle managers in a U-form firm will be 
called the middle manager for production and the middle manager for marketing. Middle managers 
choose quantities of production. A low-level manager follows the instruction of a middle manager 
on how much to produce.  
All firms have the same fixed and marginal costs of production. The fixed cost of 
production is 𝑓. Let the constant marginal cost of production be denoted by 𝑐. The marginal cost 
of marketing is also assumed to be constant and is normalized to zero. 
When multiple firms produce the same product, they engage in Cournot competition. For 𝑥, 𝑦 = 𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦, let 𝑝௫ denote the price of product 𝑥. Let 𝑄௫ denote total industry output of 
product 𝑥. Market demand for product 𝑥 is given by an inverse demand function 
   𝑝௫ = 𝑝௫(𝑄௫, 𝑄௬), 𝑥, 𝑦 = 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦.                      (1) 
Let 𝑎 and 𝑏 be positive constants. A special case of (1) is given by 
   𝑝௫ = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄௫ − 𝑑𝑄௬, 𝑥, 𝑦 = 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦.                                (2) 
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It is assumed that the inverse demand functions are symmetric with respect to the two 
products. As a result, డ௣ೣ(ொೣ,ொ೤)డொ೤ = డ௣೤(ொ೤,ொೣ)డொೣ  for all 𝑄௫ and 𝑄௬. 
Whether the two products are complements or substitutes depends on the sign of 𝜕𝑝௫(𝑄௫, 𝑄௬)/𝜕𝑄௬. If 𝜕𝑝௫(𝑄௫, 𝑄௬)/𝜕𝑄௬ < 0, the two products are substitutes; if 𝜕𝑝௫(𝑄௫, 𝑄௬)/𝜕𝑄௬ > 0, the two products are complements; if 𝜕𝑝௫(𝑄௫, 𝑄௬)/𝜕𝑄௬ = 0, the market demand of the 
two goods is independent. If 𝜕𝑝௫(𝑄௫, 𝑄௬)/𝜕𝑄௬  = 𝜕𝑝௫(𝑄௫, 𝑄௬)/𝜕𝑄௫ , the two products are 
perfect substitutes.  
The following assumptions about the inverse demand functions are made. 
ASSUMPTION 1: డ௣ೣ(ொೣ,ொ೤)డொೣ < 0. 
ASSUMPTION 2: ቚడ௣ೣ(ொೣ,ொ೤)డொೣ ቚ ≥ ቚడ௣ೣ(ொೣ,ொ೤)డொ೤ ቚ. 
Assumption 1 implies that inverse demand functions have a negative slope. Assumption 2 
implies that the demand of a product is influenced more by its own price change than by the price 
change of the other product. Assumptions 1 and 2 together lead to డ௣ೣ(ொೣ,ொ೤)డொೣ + డ௣ೣ(ொೣ,ொ೤)డொ೤ < 0. 
This inequality rules out the possibility that a product’s price may increase when total quantity 
supplied increases.  
 
Decisions in a U-form Firm 
In this subsection, the optimal decisions in a U-form firm are studied. In a U-form firm, 
the middle manager of production decides how much to produce first. The marketing department 
cannot sell more than what the production department produces. It is assumed that the manager of 
production chooses transfer prices to maximize her division’s profit, rather than the whole firm's 
profit. However, when choosing transfer prices, she takes it into account that her decisions will 
affect final demand for her firm’s products and thus her division’s profit. 
 The assumption that the middle manager of production sets transfer prices to maximize her 
division’s profit rather than the firm’s profit merits some discussion. Why doesn’t the top manger 
decide the amount of production and the transfer prices? For a small firm, a top manger may be 
able to make all the important decisions. However, for a large firm, the top manager may not have 
as much information about cost and market demand as a middle manager has. Whether a middle 
manager is evaluated by her absolute performance or by a rank-order tournament, a middle 
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manager's payoff increases with her own department's revenue. Therefore, a middle level manager 
has incentives to maximize her division’s profit. 
The middle manager of marketing chooses quantities to sell to maximize the marketing 
division’s profit. Let 𝑡௫ denote product 𝑥's transfer price between the production department and 
the marketing department, 𝑥 = 𝑖, 𝑗. Let 𝑞௨௫ denote a representative U-form firm's product 𝑥 output. 
Since the same middle manager supervises the sale of both products, this manager will take into 
account the fact that market demands are interdependent. Given the transfer prices charged by the 
production departments, this middle manager of marketing maximizes the sum of the profits of the 
two products 
   (𝑝௜ − 𝑡௜)𝑞௨௜ + (𝑝௝ − 𝑡௝)𝑞௨௝ .             (3) 
Taking first order condition with respect to 𝑞௨௫ leads to 
   𝑝௫ − 𝑡௫ + 𝑞௨௫ డ௣ೣడொೣ + 𝑞௨௬ డ௣೤డொೣ = 0.            (4) 
The middle manager of production chooses transfer prices to maximize the production 
division’s profit. Through backward induction, a U-form firm’s middle manager of production can 
figure out the final demand as a function of transfer prices. She chooses 𝑡௜ and 𝑡௝ to maximize her 
division’s profit 
    (𝑡௜ − 𝑐)𝑞௨௜ + (𝑡௝ − 𝑐)𝑞௨௝ .           (5) 
 Taking first order condition with respect to 𝑡௫ yields 
   𝑞௨௫ + (𝑡௫ − 𝑐) ௗ௤ೠೣௗ௧ೣ + (𝑡௬ − 𝑐) ௗ௤ೠ೤ௗ௧೤ = 0.          (6) 
 Differentiation of (4) with respect to 𝑞௨௫, 𝑞௨௬, and 𝑡௫ leads to 
 ቀ2 డ௣ೣడொೣ + 𝑞௨௫ డమ௣ೣడమொೣ + 𝑞௨௬ డమ௣೤డమொೣቁ 𝑑𝑞௨௫ +ቀడ௣ೣడொ೤ + డ௣೤డொೣ + 𝑞௨௫ డమ௣ೣడொೣడொ೤ + 𝑞௨௬ డమ௣೤డொೣడொ೤ቁ 𝑑𝑞௨௬ = 𝑑𝑡௫, 𝑥, 𝑦 = 𝑖, 𝑗.         (7) 
 The above system can be expressed as 
ተተ2 𝜕𝑝௜𝜕𝑄௜ + 𝑞௨௜ 𝜕ଶ𝑝௜𝜕ଶ𝑄௜ + 𝑞௨௝ 𝜕ଶ𝑝௝𝜕ଶ𝑄௜ 𝜕𝑝௜𝜕𝑄௜ + 𝜕𝑝௝𝜕𝑄௜ + 𝑞௨௜ 𝜕ଶ𝑝௜𝜕𝑄௜𝜕𝑄௝ + 𝑞௨௝ 𝜕ଶ𝑝௝𝜕𝑄௜𝜕𝑄௝𝜕𝑝௜𝜕𝑄௝ + 𝜕𝑝௝𝜕𝑄௜ + 𝑞௨௝ 𝜕ଶ𝑝௝𝜕𝑄௜𝜕𝑄௝ + 𝑞௨௜ 𝜕ଶ𝑝௜𝜕𝑄௜𝜕𝑄௝ 2 𝜕𝑝௝𝜕𝑄௝ + 𝑞௨௝ 𝜕ଶ𝑝௝𝜕ଶ𝑄௝ + 𝑞௨௜ 𝜕ଶ𝑝௜𝜕ଶ𝑄௝ተተ 
         × ቤ𝑑𝑞௨௜𝑑𝑞௨௝ ቤ = ฬ𝑑𝑡௜0 ฬ. 
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The determinant of the coefficient matrix is 
  ቀ2 డ௣೔డொ೔ + 𝑞௨௜ డమ௣೔డమொ೔ + 𝑞௨௝ డమ௣ೕడమொ೔ቁଶ −ቀడ௣೔డொೕ + డ௣ೕడொ೔ + 𝑞௨௜ డమ௣೔డொ೔డொೕ + 𝑞௨௝ డమ௣ೕడொ೔డொೕቁଶ.           (8) 
 Application of the Cramer’s rule leads to 
  i
i
u
dt
dq ቀ2 డ௣ೕడொೕ + 𝑞௨௜ డమ௣೔డమொೕ + 𝑞௨௝ డమ௣ೕడమொೕቁ /𝛥,          (9a) 
  ௗ௤ೠೕௗ௧೔ = −ቀడ௣೔డொೕ + డ௣ೕడொ೔ + 𝑞௨௜ డమ௣೔డொ೔డொೕ + 𝑞௨௝ డమ௣ೕడொ೔డொೕቁ /𝛥.         (9b) 
 Define  
  1 ቀ2 డ௣ೕడொೕ + 𝑞௨௜ డమ௣೔డమொೕ + 𝑞௨௝ డమ௣ೕడమொೕቁ −ቀడ௣೔డொೕ + డ௣ೕడொ೔ + 𝑞௨௜ డమ௣೔డொ೔డொೕ + 𝑞௨௝ డమ௣ೕడொ೔డொೕቁ.         (10) 
 Since demand is symmetric, equations 8 and 10 lead to 
  ௱௱భ = 2ቀడ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕቁ + 𝑞௨ ቀ2 డమ௣೔డொ೔డொೕ + డమ௣೔డమொ೔ + డమ௣ೕడమொ೔ቁ.         (11) 
 From equations 9 and 10, it is clear that 
    ௗ௤ೠ೔ௗ௧೔ + ௗ௤ೠೕௗ௧೔ = ௱భ௱ .           (12) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, 𝑡௜ = 𝑡௝ = 𝑡. Plugging equation 12 into 6 yields 
    𝑡 = 𝑐 − 𝑞௨௫ ௱௱భ.            (13) 
From 13, the transfer price will be larger than the production cost if and only if −𝛥/𝛥ଵ is 
positive. The following assumption is sufficient for −𝛥/𝛥ଵ to be positive. 
ASSUMPTION 3: 𝑇௨ ≡ ቀడ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕቁ + 𝑞௨ ቀ2 డమ௣೔డொ೔డொೕ + డమ௣೔డమொ೔ + డమ௣ೕడమொ೔ቁ < 0. 
Assumption 3 states that a U-form firm’s marginal revenue must not rise with its rivals’ 
outputs. It is a weak assumption. Similar assumptions are standard in Cournot analysis. 5 For 
example, for 𝑋 denoting the output of a product and 𝑝 denoting the price, Novshek (1985) shows 
that 𝑝′(𝑋) + 𝑋𝑝′′(𝑋) ≤ 0 guarantees the existence of a Cournot equilibrium. Assumption 3 is the 
                                                          
5 Dixit (1986) and Shapiro (1989) provide more motivation for these assumptions. Dixit (1986) also illustrates the 
relationship between these kinds of assumptions and stability conditions. 
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analogy of the above inequality for the case when there are two products. If Assumption 3 is 
satisfied, the reaction curve of a U-form firm has a negative slope. 
The following assumptions are similar to Assumption 3. 
ASSUMPTION 4: 𝑇௠ ≡ ቀడ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕቁ + 𝑞௠ ቀడమ௣೔డమொ೔ + డమ௣ೕడொ೔డொೕቁ < 0. 
ASSUMPTION 5:  2𝑇௨ + ቀడ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕቁ 
          +2𝑚𝑞௨ ቆ2 డమ௣೔డொ೔డொೕ + డమ௣೔డమொ೔ + డమ௣ೕడమொ೔ + 𝑞௨ ቀడయ௣೔డయொ೔ + 2 డయ௣೔డమொ೔డொೕ + డయ௣೔డொ೔డమொೕቁቇ < 0. 
Assumption 4 states that an M-form firm’s marginal revenue must not rise with its rivals’ 
outputs. If Assumption 4 is satisfied, the reaction curve of an M-form firm has a negative slope. 
Assumption 5 states that a U-form firm’s marketing department’s marginal revenue must not rise 
with other firms’ outputs. If Assumption 5 is satisfied, the transfer price does not decrease with 
the U-form firm’s output.6 Novshek (1985) shows that if a firm’s marginal revenue is everywhere 
a declining function of the aggregate output of other firms, a Cournot equilibrium exists. In his 
proof, firms are not required to be identical. From Novshek (1985), Assumptions 3-5 guarantee 
the existence of a Cournot equilibrium. 
In a symmetric equilibrium, 𝑞௨௜ = 𝑞௨௝ = 𝑞௨. Plugging equation 13 into 4 leads to one of the 
two equations defining optimal output choices 
   𝑝௫ − 𝑐 + 𝑞௨ డ௣ೣడொೣ + 𝑞௨ ቀడ௣೤డொೣ + ௱௱భቁ = 0.         (14) 
 
Decisions in an M-form Firm 
In this subsection, the output decisions of an M-form firm are studied. It is assumed that 
the middle manager of product 𝑥’s payoff is not affected by the profit of product 𝑦. In other words, 
a tournament incentive scheme or a profit-sharing incentive scheme is not used here. One reason 
why these incentive schemes are not used is that it is hard to prevent collusion of middle managers 
or collusion between the top manager and a middle manager, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) for 
a related argument. In addition, when there are more than one firm in the industry, a profit-sharing 
scheme may decrease this firm’s output and benefit its competitors, see Freshtman and Judd (1987) 
for a study of strategic manipulation of incentives in oligopolistic competition. 
                                                          
6 For the linear demand defined in equation 2, Assumptions 3-5 are satisfied if Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. 
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Let 𝑞௠௫  denote this firm's output of product 𝑥, 𝑥 = 𝑖, 𝑗. The middle manager of product 𝑥 
is concerned only with product 𝑥's profit and he ignores demand externality imposed on product 𝑦. Thus, the middle manager of product 𝑥 maximizes the divisional profit  
    (𝑝௫ − 𝑐)𝑞௠௫ .             (15) 
Taking first order condition with respect to 𝑞௠௫  yields the second equation defining optimal 
output choices 
    𝑝௫ − 𝑐 + 𝑞௠௫ డ௣ೣడொೣ = 0.              (16) 
 
Comparison of the Two Organizational Forms 
In this subsection, the output and profit of the two organizational forms are compared. In a 
symmetric equilibrium, 𝑞௠௜ = 𝑞௠௝ = 𝑞௠. Equations 13 and 14 lead to 
  𝑉ଵ ≡ 𝑝௫ − 𝑡 + 𝑞௨ డ௣ೣడொೣ + 𝑞௨ డ௣೤డொೣ = 0.          (17) 
Equation 16 leads to  
  𝑉ଶ ≡ 𝑝௫ − 𝑐 + 𝑞௠ డ௣ೣడொೣ = 0.           (18) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, all U-form firms produce the same amount of output 𝑞௨. All 
M-form firms produce the same amount of output 𝑞௠. In a symmetric equilibrium, output of the 
two products are the same and 𝑄௜ = 𝑄௝ = 𝑄. Thus, total industry output is given by  
    𝑄 = 𝑚𝑞௨ + (𝑛 −𝑚)𝑞௠.           (19) 
Define  a constant 
    𝛿 ≡ ௠௡ . 
 Then 
    𝑄 ≡ 𝑛(𝛿𝑞௨ + (1 − 𝛿)𝑞௠).              (19’) 
The profit from adopting the U-form organizational mode is 
    𝜋௨ = 2(𝑝(𝑄) − 𝑐)𝑞௨ − 𝑓.        (20a) 
The profit from adopting the M-form organizational mode is 
    𝜋௠ = 2(𝑝(𝑄) − 𝑐)𝑞௠ − 𝑓.        (20b) 
As firms receive the same price for their product, a firm has a higher profit, if and only if, 
it has a higher output. The following proposition compares the output and the profit of an M-form 
firm with that of a U-form firm. 
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 PROPOSITION 1. When there are multiple firms in the industry, an M-form firm produces 
more (less) than a U-form firm and has a higher (lower) profit if and only if ቀడ௣೤డொೣ + ௱௱భቁ < 0 
(ቀడ௣೤డொೣ + ௱௱భቁ > 0). 
 PROOF. From equations 14 and 18, 𝑞௠ > 𝑞௨ if and only if ቀడ௣೤డொೣ + ௱௱భቁ < 0. ∎ 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 1 is the following: There are two factors affecting the 
ranking of a U-form firm’s output with that of an M-form firm. The first term in the bracket 
(𝜕𝑝௬/𝜕𝑄௫) measures demand interdependence of the two products. The second term in the bracket 
(𝛥/𝛥ଵ) measures the degree of double marginalization.7 If the two products are substitutes, the 
term in the bracket is negative and an M-form firm produces more of both products than a U-form 
firm. The reason is that both the elimination of double marginalization and the ignorance of 
negative demand externalities in an M-form firm increase an M-form firm’s output. If 𝜕𝑝௬/𝜕𝑄௫ 
is sufficiently positive such that ቀడ௣೤డொೣ + ௱௱భቁ > 0, an M-form firm produces less than a U-form firm 
because of the ignorance of positive demand externalities in an M-form firm. 
Differentiation of 17 with respect to 𝑞௨, 𝑞௠, 𝑛, and 𝑚 yields 
    డ௏భడ௤ೠ 𝑑𝑞௨ + డ௏భడ௤೘ 𝑑𝑞௠ = − డ௏భడ௡ 𝑑𝑛 − డ௏భడ௠ 𝑑𝑚.         (21) 
Differentiation of 18 with respect to 𝑞௨, 𝑞௠, 𝑛, and 𝑚 yields 
    డ௏మడ௤ೠ 𝑑𝑞௨ + డ௏మడ௤೘ 𝑑𝑞௠ = − డ௏మడ௡ 𝑑𝑛 − డ௏మడ௠ 𝑑𝑚.         (22) 
 Equations 21 and 22 can be expressed as 
   ቮడ௏భడ௤ೠ డ௏భడ௤೘డ௏మడ௤ೠ డ௏మడ௤೘ቮ ฬ𝑑𝑞௨𝑑𝑞௠ฬ = ቮ−
డ௏భడ௡− డ௏మడ௡ ቮ 𝑑𝑛 + ቮ− డ௏భడ௠− డ௏మడ௠ቮ 𝑑𝑚.         (23) 
 From equations 17, 18, and 19’, it can be shown that డ௏భడ௤ೠ = 𝑛𝛿𝑇௨ + డ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕ − డ௧డ௤ೠ,          (24) డ௏భడ௤೘ = 𝑛(1 − 𝛿)𝑇௨ < 0,           (25) 
                                                          
7 For a detailed study on double marginalization, see Spengler (1950). 
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డ௏భడ௡ = (𝛿𝑞௨ + (1 − 𝛿)𝑞௠)𝑇௨ < 0,          (26) డ௏భడ௠ = (𝑞௠ − 𝑞௨)𝑇௨,            (27) డ௏మడ௤ೠ = 𝑛𝛿𝑇௠ < 0,             (28) డ௏మడ௤೘ = 𝑛(1 − 𝛿)𝑇௠ + డ௣೔డொ೔ < 0,          (29) డ௏మడ௡ = (𝛿𝑞௨ + (1 − 𝛿)𝑞௠)𝑇௠ < 0,          (30) డ௏మడ௠ = (𝑞௠ − 𝑞௨)𝑇௠.            (31) 
The determinant of the coefficient matrix for equation 23 is 𝑇 ≡ 𝜕𝑉ଵ𝜕𝑞௨ 𝜕𝑉ଶ𝜕𝑞௠ − 𝜕𝑉ଵ𝜕𝑞௠ 𝜕𝑉ଶ𝜕𝑞௨ 
 = డ௣೔డொ೔ 𝑛𝛿𝑇௨ + ቀడ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕ − డ௧డ௤ೠቁ 𝑛(1 − 𝛿)𝑇௠ + డ௣೔డொ೔ ቀడ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕ − డ௧డ௤ೠቁ.         (32) 
From equations 11 and 13, it can be shown that డ௧డ௤ೠ =    
 −2𝑇௨ − 2𝑚𝑞௨ ቆ2 డమ௣೔డொ೔డொೕ + డమ௣೔డమொ೔ + డమ௣ೕడమொ೔ + 𝑞௨ ቀడయ௣೔డయொ೔ + 2 డయ௣೔డమொ೔డொೕ + డయ௣೔డொ೔డమொೕቁቇ. 
Under Assumption 5,  డ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕ − డ௧డ௤ೠ < 0.            (33) 
 From 33 and Assumptions 1-5, 𝑇 > 0.  
The following lemma studies how each firm’s output and total output change with the 
number of firms in the industry while the proportion of M-form firms does not change. 
 
LEMMA 1. Under Assumptions 1-5, (i) each firm’s output decreases with the total number 
of firms in the industry; (ii) total output increases with the total number of firms in the industry. 
PROOF. (i) Applying the Cramer’s rule, from equation 23, it can be shown that 
   ௗ௤ೠௗ௡ = −(𝛿𝑞௨ + (1 − 𝛿)𝑞௠) డ௣೔డொ೔ ೠ்் < 0,             (34) 
   ௗ௤೘ௗ௡ = −(𝛿𝑞௨ + (1 − 𝛿)𝑞௠)(డ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕ − డ௧డ௤ೠ) ೘்் < 0.       (35) 
(ii) Differentiation of equation 19 with respect to 𝑛 yields 
   ௗொௗ௡ = 𝑞௠ +𝑚 ௗ௤ೠௗ௡ + (𝑛 −𝑚) ௗ௤೘ௗ௡ .          (36) 
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Plugging equations 34 and 35 into 36 yields 
  ௗொௗ௡ = 𝛿𝑞௨ + (1 − 𝛿)𝑞௠ + 𝑛𝛿 ௗ௤ೠௗ௡ + 𝑛(1 − 𝛿) ௗ௤೘ௗ௡  
  = డ௣೔డொ೔ (డ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕ − డ௧డ௤ೠ) (ఋ௤ೠା(ଵିఋ)௤೘)் > 0. ∎ 
 
Lemma 1 is consistent with results from conventional Cournot competition. When one 
additional firm enters the industry, for a given level of market demand, existing firms’ marginal 
revenue decreases. As a result, existing firms’ quantities of production decreases. As the increase 
of output from the new firm dominates the decrease of output from existing firms, total industry 
output increases when the total number of firms increases. 
From equations 20a and 20b, firms have different profits, if and only if, they have different 
output levels. Thus, 𝑞௠ − 𝑞௨ may be viewed as the advantage of being an M-form firm. Suppose 
currently an M-form has a higher level of profit. Thus, a new firm entering the industry will adopt 
the M-form firm. Does the advantage of choosing the M-form persist with the entry of a new M-
form firm? This question motivates the following proposition which studies how the number of 
firms in an industry affects the advantage of choosing the M-form. 
 
 PROPOSITION 2. If the proportion of M-form firms does not change, the advantage of being 
an M-form firm increases with the number of firms in the industry if and only if  
   ೠ்ങ೛೔ങೂ೔ାങ೛೔ങೂೕି ങ೟ങ೜ೠ > ೘்ങ೛೔ങೂ೔ .            (37) 
 PROOF. From Lemma 1, both types of firms’ output decreases as 𝑛 increases. Thus, what 
matters is the magnitude of the decrease in output. 
 From equations 34 and 35, it is clear that 
   ௗ௤ೠ/ௗ௡ௗ௤೘/ௗ௡ = ങ೛೔ങೂ೔ ೠ்൬ങ೛೔ങೂ೔ାങ೛೔ങೂೕି ങ೟ങ೜ೠ൰ ೘்.           (38) 
 Thus, 𝑑𝑞௨/𝑑𝑛 > 𝑑𝑞௠/𝑑𝑛 if and only if 37 holds. ∎ 
 
 In inequality 37, 𝑇௨ (𝑇௠) measures how a U-form (an M-form) firm’s marginal revenue 
changes with other firms’ output. The expression డ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕ − డ௧డ௤ೠ measures how average revenue 
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changes with output from the viewpoint of the marketing department of a U-form firm, and డ௣೔డொ೔ 
measures how average revenue changes with output for an M-form firm manager. Thus, the left-
hand side (right-hand side) measures the slope of the U-form (M-form) firm’s reaction curve. If 
the U-form firm’s slope is larger (smaller) than that of an M-form firm, its output contracts more 
(less) than the M-form firm.8  
 
3. Equilibrium Organization Mode 
In this section, the firms’ equilibrium choice of organizational forms is studied. In 
equilibrium, no firm can make a profit by switching to a different organizational form. In addition, 
each firm should make a nonnegative profit in equilibrium.  
The following lemma studies the impact of a firm’s switching from the M-form to the U-
form when the number of firms in the industry is fixed. 
 
LEMMA 2. Under Assumptions 1-5, if an M-form firm switches to U-form, (i) except for 
the firm that switches from the M-form to the U-form, any other firm’s output increases if and 
only if ቀడ௣೤డொೣ + ௱௱భቁ < 0; (ii) total output decreases if and only if ቀడ௣೤డொೣ + ௱௱భቁ < 0; (iii) every other 
firm’s profit increases if and only if ቀడ௣೤డொೣ + ௱௱భቁ < 0. 
PROOF. (i) Applying Cramer’s rule, from equations 27 and 31, it can be shown that 
   ௗ௤ೠௗ௠ = −(𝑞௠ − 𝑞௨) డ௣೔డொ೔ ೠ்்,           (39) 
   ௗ௤೘ௗ௠ = −(𝑞௠ − 𝑞௨)(డ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕ − డ௧డ௤ೠ) ೘்்.         (40) 
 From equation 39, 𝑑𝑞௨/𝑑𝑚 > 0 if and only if 𝑞௠ > 𝑞௨. From equation 40, 𝑑𝑞௠/𝑑𝑚 > 0 
if and only if 𝑞௠ > 𝑞௨. 
(ii) Differentiation of 19 with respect to 𝑚 yields 
   ௗொௗ௠ = (𝑞௨ − 𝑞௠) + 𝑚 ௗ௤ೠௗ௠ + (𝑛 −𝑚) ௗ௤೘ௗ௠ .         (41) 
Plugging equations 39 and 40 into 41 yields 
   ௗொௗ௠ = − డ௣೔డொ೔ (డ௣೔డொ೔ + డ௣೔డொೕ − డ௧డ௤ೠ) (௤ೠି௤೘)் .         (42) 
                                                          
8 If the demand is linear, equation 37 degenerates to 2𝑏 + 3𝑑 > 0. 
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From 42, 𝑑𝑄/𝑑𝑚 < 0 if and only if 𝑞௠ > 𝑞௨.     
(iii) Differentiation of 20a with respect to 𝑚 yields ௗగೠௗ௠ = 2(𝑝 − 𝑐) ௗ௤ೠௗ௠ + 2ቀ డ௣డொ೔ + డ௣డொೕቁ డொడ௠ 𝑞௨ > 0. 
Differentiation of 20b with respect to 𝑚 yields ௗగ೘ௗ௠ = 2(𝑝 − 𝑐) ௗ௤೘ௗ௠ + 2ቀ డ௣డொ೔ + డ௣డொೕቁ డொడ௠ 𝑞௠ > 0. ∎ 
 
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is the following: part (i) of Lemma 2 comes from the fact 
that reaction functions have a negative slope. As a U-form firm produces less than an M-form 
under the condition that ቀడ௣೤డொೣ + ௱௱భቁ < 0, each firm will produce more when the number of U-form 
firms increases. For part (ii), there are two effects on industry output when an M-form firm 
switches to the U-form. First, every other firm produces more. Second, the number of M-form 
firms decreases. An M-form firm produces more than a U-form firm and the two effects work on 
opposition directions. Part (ii) of Lemma 2 says that the second effect dominates the first one. For 
part (iii), since total industry output decreases as the number of U-form firms increases, market 
price increases as 𝑚 increases. When an M-form firm switches to the U-form, every other firm’s 
output increases. Every other firm’s profit increases as price also increases. If ቀడ௣೤డொೣ + ௱௱భቁ > 0, 𝑞௨ > 𝑞௠. In this case, if a firm switches from the M-form to the U-form, the opposite results 
obtain. 
 
4. Linear Demand 
In this section, the case of linear demand is studied. This additional structure leads to 
stronger results. Also, the impact of a change in the degree of substitution can be parameterized 
and examined. The inverse demand function is given by equation 2. In this linear case, 𝜕𝑝௬/𝜕𝑄௫ +𝛥/𝛥ଵ < 0 requires that 2𝑏 + 3𝑑 > 0. If 𝑑 > 0, the two products are substitutes; if 𝑑 = 0, the 
demand for the two products are independent; if 𝑑 < 0, the two products are complements. 
Equations 2, 14, and 17 lead to 
  𝑞௨ = ௕(௔ି௖)(௕ାௗ)[௕(௠ାଷ)ାଷ(௕ାௗ)(௡ି௠)],        (43a) 
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  𝑞௠ = ଷ(௔ି௖)௕(௠ାଷ)ାଷ(௕ାௗ)(௡ି௠).9         (43b) 
From equations 43a and 43b, when 𝑑 increases, 𝑞௨ and 𝑞௠ decrease. Thus, each firm’s 
output decreases with the degree of substitutability between the two products. A U-form firm’s 
output decreases at a higher rate than that of an M-form firm. 
Plugging equations 47a and 47b into equation 19 yields 
   𝑄 = ௠௕ାଷ(௡ି௠)(௕ାௗ)(௕ାௗ)[௕(௠ାଷ)ାଷ(௕ାௗ)(௡ି௠)] (𝑎 − 𝑐).        (44) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, market prices of the two products are the same, 𝑝௜ = 𝑝௝ = 𝑝. 
Plugging 44 into 2 leads to 
   𝑝 − 𝑐 = ଷ௕(௔ି௖)௕(௠ାଷ)ାଷ(௕ାௗ)(௡ି௠).                    (45) 
From equations 43a and 45, the profit of a U-form firm is 
   u ଺௕మ(௔ି௖)మ(௕ାௗ)[௕(௠ାଷ)ାଷ(௕ାௗ)(௡ି௠)]మ − 𝑓.      (46a) 
 From equations 43b and 45, the profit of an M-form firm is 
   𝜋௠ = ଵ଼௕(௔ି௖)మ[௕(௠ାଷ)ାଷ(௕ାௗ)(௡ି௠)]మ − 𝑓.       (46b) 
The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for all firms to 
adopt the M-form (the U-form) organizational mode. 
 
PROPOSITION 3. If demand is linear, all firms adopting the M-form mode is the unique 
equilibrium if and only if 2𝑏 + 3𝑑 > 0. If 2𝑏 + 3𝑑 = 0, a firm is indifferent between the two 
organizational forms. All firms adopting the U-form mode is the unique equilibrium if and only if 2𝑏 + 3𝑑 < 0. 
PROOF. From equations 46a and 46b, 𝜋௠ > 𝜋௨ if and only if 2𝑏 + 3𝑑 > 0. ∎ 
 
As 𝑏  is always positive, 𝑑 < 0  is necessary for 2𝑏 + 3𝑑 < 0 . Thus, Proposition 3 
highlights the role played by the coefficient 𝑑. There are some remarks for Proposition 3. First, for 𝑑 = 0 , 2𝑏 + 3𝑑 ≥ 0  is satisfied. Thus, all firms adopting the M-form mode is the unique 
equilibrium if the market demand for the two products is independent. Second, for 2𝑏 + 3𝑑 = 0, 
                                                          
9 When 𝑚 = 0 and 𝑑 = 0, from 43a, 𝑞௠ = (𝑎 − 𝑐)/(𝑏(𝑛 + 1)). This is the usual Cournot output level when there are 𝑛  firms in the industry. When 𝑚 = 𝑛  and 𝑑 = 0 , from equation 43b, 𝑞௨ = (𝑎 − 𝑐)/(𝑏(𝑛 + 3)) . With the existence of double marginalization, this output is less than the usual Cournot output. 
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as firms are indifferent between the two organizational forms, the M-form mode coexists with the 
U-form mode. Finally, a U-form monopolist’s profit is always less than an M-form monopolist’s 
profit if products are substitutes. So a monopolist’s profit is higher if it adopts the M-form even 
when goods are perfect substitutes (𝑏 = 𝑑). This is surprising, as we may have thought that either 
organization form has some disadvantages and no one form will dominate the other.  
In the literature, there are some empirical and experimental studies comparing the 
performance of the U-form and the M-form firms. Studying a sample of petroleum firms  
during the period 1955-1973, Armour and Teece (1978) conclude that empirical results are broadly 
consistent with the M-form hypothesis which states that the M-form leads to a higher profit level 
than the U-form organizational mode. In Burton and Obel’s (1988) experimental study, they 
conclude that the M-form hypothesis is supported. In a laboratory experiment in which students 
assumed the divisional and departmental manager roles, the M-form organization leads to greater 
total profits than the U-form under which format opportunistic behavior is possible. 
 
5. Conclusion 
If product quantities can be contracted on ex ante, organizational forms will not matter. In 
real world situations, many contingencies cannot be foreseen and contracted upon. As a result, 
organizational forms play important roles in affecting managers’ incentives. A natural question is 
which factors determine a firm's optimal choice of organizational form. Both the U-form and the 
M-form organizational modes have advantages and disadvantages. In this paper, it is shown that a 
firm's optimal choice of organizational form is affected by market structure.  
One important assumption in this paper is that firms provide homogenous products and 
engage in quantity competition. If firms produce differentiated products and engage in price 
competition, the result will be more complicated. As the type of reaction curve is only one of the 
two factors affecting a firm’s organizational choice (the other one being the tradeoff between 
double marginalization and the ignorance of demand externalities), changing the type of 
competition is not likely to reverse the results established in this article. In the case of homogenous 
product, as firms receive the same price, a firm has a higher profit if and only if it has a higher 
level of output. With differentiated products, firms have different quantities of production and also 
different prices. It is difficult to compare the profit levels of different types of firms. For example, 
consider the case when the two products are substitutes. With the existence of double 
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marginalization and the consideration that the two products are substitutes, the price of a U-form 
firm will be higher than that of an M-form firm. But it is unclear whether the profit of a U-form 
firm is higher or lower than that of an M-form firm. 
In this paper, both organizational forms are assumed to have the same level of fixed cost 
of production. An alternative approach is that for a U-form firm, the fixed cost is 𝑓, while in an 
M-form firm, the fixed cost is 2𝑓. Thus a U-form firm has the benefits of economies of scale. One 
source of economies of scale may come from the large volume purchase of raw materials and joint 
marketing in a U-form firm. The existence of significant economies of scale may justify the 
existence of large U-form firms. 
The model may be extended in various directions. First, in this article, each firm produces 
only two products. The case where a firm produces more than two products may be studied. 
Second, there are no demand or cost uncertainties. These kinds of uncertainties may play important 
roles in affecting firms’ optimal choice of organizational forms. Finally, it has been assumed that 
marginal production cost and marginal marketing cost are constant. Generalization to a general 
cost function may be an interesting topic for future research. 
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